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INTRODUCTION
In this “age of statutes,”1 the federal judiciary performs the
critical role and function of interpreting and applying statutes in
cases and controversies brought to the courts for adjudication
and decision. The courts act within the separation-of-powers
structure of the United States Constitution,2 a structure
popularized prior to the nation’s founding by French lawyer and
political philosopher Baron de Montesquieu.3
†

Alumnae Law Center Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
J.D., The University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Wilberforce University. The
author acknowledges and is thankful for the research support provided by the
Alumnae Law Center donors and the University of Houston Law Foundation.
1
See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 166 (1982).
2
“All legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,”
the “executive Power shall be vested in a President,” and the “judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1;
art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1.
3
See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS: A COMPENDIUM OF THE FIRST
ENGLISH EDITION (David W. Carrithers ed., 1977). Bruce Ackerman has noted
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s observation that Montesquieu’s account of
England’s “threefold division of power into legislative, executive and judicial—was a
fiction invented by him, a fiction which misled Blackstone and Delome.” Bruce

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

809

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 211 Side A



37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 211 Side B

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_TURNER

810

3/29/2016 4:30 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:809

Concerned with “the distribution of powers among the three
coequal [b]ranches,”4 the principle of separation of powers,
implied in the Constitution’s governmental structure, “left to
each [branch, the] power to exercise, in some respects, functions
in their nature executive, legislative and judicial.”5 Under this
view, “legislatures rather than courts should make law.”6 This
notion is reflected in the axiom—indeed, the mantra—that courts
must only interpret and not make law.7 Those who subscribe to
this make-no-law position believe that courts should only identify
and implement the legislative mandate and go no further, and
courts should not “substitute their own policy preferences
through the creation and application of public values canons for
the preferences of Congress as articulated in the words and
history of the statute.”8
Others reject the idea that judges merely find and announce,
but do not and should not make, law. In the view of one jurist,
this “is a fictitious and even a childish approach.”9 Judge
Richard Posner has remarked that “[a]ppellate judges are
occasional legislators”10 and that “judges make up much of the
law that they are purporting to be merely applying.”11 That
judges may make law is inevitable and necessary, for it is
predictable that legislators cannot anticipate all of the
postenactment issues and questions that will arise with regard to
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Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1795 n.181 (2007)
(quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Montesquieu, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
250, 263 (1920)).
4
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167–68 (1991).
5
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 (1989) (alteration in original)
(quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 84 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
6
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence:
The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1861 (1998).
7
See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in
Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 744 (1992).
8
Id.
9
Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in
a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 23 (2002).
10
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 81 (2008) (emphasis omitted).
11
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 61 (2003); see also
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“I am not so naive . . . as to be unaware that judges in a real sense
‘make’ law.”); Erwin N. Griswold, Cutting the Cloak to Fit the Cloth: An Approach to
Problems in the Federal Courts, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 787, 801 (1983) (“Everyone
knows that judges do make law, and should make law. It is rather a question of how
much law they should make.”).
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the operative meaning of a statutory provision in specific cases,
circumstances, and contexts.12 Given this reality, courts will fill
gaps in statutory text,13 making law in the process.
This Article focuses on judicial lawmaking and policymaking
in an important area of antidiscrimination law—Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964’s regulatory regime.14 As enacted in
1964, Title VII only prohibited intentional employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
The statute requires a finding that an
national origin.15
employer “has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint.”16 “[Such] ‘disparate treatment’ . . . is the most easily
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats
some people less favorably than others . . . . Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical . . . .”17 Thereafter, in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,18 the United States Supreme Court held that
Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”19
Title VII claims alleging such “ ‘disparate impact’ . . . involve
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment
of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” The
Court held, “Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required
under a disparate-impact theory.”20
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12
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (3d ed. 2012); 1 F.A. HAYEK,
LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 119 (1973).
13
See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113–14
(1921) (“He [the judge] legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the
law. How far he may go without traveling beyond the walls of the interstices cannot
be staked out for him upon a chart.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The
Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (1987) (“The national
legislature expresses itself too often in commands that are unclear, imprecise, or
gap-ridden . . . .”).
14
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2014).
15
See § 2000e-2(a)(1).
16
§ 2000e-5(g)(1).
17
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
18
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
19
Id. at 431.
20
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
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As discussed in Part I, the Court’s landmark Griggs decision
is an exemplar of judge-made law, a “judicial rather than a
legislative creation.”21 The Congress that enacted Title VII in
1964 did not conceive of or intend to impose Title VII liability for
the adverse effects of employer practices in the absence of proof
of an employer’s discriminatory motive.22 Thus, the Griggs
Court’s expansion of the statute’s scope to cover and prohibit
certain facially neutral and concededly unintentional employer
acts created a fundamental public value opposing—and provided
a cause of action by which plaintiffs could challenge—disparate
impact in the workplace.
Griggs was not the first and last stop in the Court’s
disparate-impact jurisprudence. As discussed in Part II, in its
1989 decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,23 the Court
again made law when it made significant changes in the
allocation of the evidentiary burdens borne by plaintiffs and
employers in disparate-impact litigation.24 Two years later,
Congress responded to the Wards Cove Court’s lawmaking by
making a law of its own—the Civil Rights Act of 1991, wherein
Congress codified the disparate-impact cause of action and
expressly set out the elements of the plaintiff’s claim and an
employer’s defense thereto.25 Additionally, in its 2009 decision in
Ricci v. DeStefano,26 the Court, again making law, formulated a
new and extrastatutory rule governing an employer’s decision to
discard what the Court believed to be a disparate-impact-causing
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21
Margaret Thornton, Sexual Harassment Losing Sight of Sex Discrimination,
26 MELB. U. L. REV. 422, 425 (2002).
22
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 197 (1992) (“If in 1964 any sponsor of the Civil
Rights Act had admitted Title VII on the ground that it adopted the disparate
impact test read into it by the Supreme Court in Griggs, Title VII would have gone
down to thundering defeat and perhaps brought the rest of the act down with it.”);
Michael Evan Gold, Griggs’ Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of
the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a
Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 432 (1985) (“Congress did not
intend to outlaw adverse impact; disparate treatment was the Eighty-eighth
Congress’ only definition of discrimination.”); id. at 481 (“[T]here is overwhelming
evidence that Congress did not intend to legislate adverse impact . . . .”).
23
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
24
Id. at 655–57, 659–61.
25
See infra Part II.B.
26
557 U.S. 557 (2009).
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employment examination.27 The Court’s journey from Griggs to
Ricci and its repeated judicial lawmaking in this important area
of antidiscrimination law are the foci of this Article.
I.
A.

GRIGGS V. DUKE POWER CO.

The Case and the Court’s Decision

In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,28 the Court, interpreting Title
VII section 703(a)(2)29:
We granted the writ in this case to resolve the question whether
an employer is prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title
VII, from requiring a high school education or passing of a
standardized general intelligence test as a condition of
employment in or transfer to jobs when (a) neither standard is
shown to be significantly related to successful job performance,
(b) both requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at a
substantially higher rate than white applicants, and (c) the jobs
in question formerly had been filled only by white employees as
part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to whites.30


27

Id. at 563; see also discussion infra Part III.
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
29
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (West 2014). The provision in question reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees . . . in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.; see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2517 (2015) (noting that the Griggs Court “relied solely on [Title VII]
§ 703(a)(2)”). Note that the Court did not interpret section 703(a)(1), which provides
that it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
By focusing on section 703(a)(2) rather than section 703(a)(1)’s “standard harmful
intent doctrine,” civil rights lawyers “sought to exploit the dualism in [s]ection 703
(a)” and align section 703(a)(2) “with their new doctrine of harmful effects or
disparate impact.” HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 249–50 (1990). For a discussion
of the pros and cons of the Court’s interpretation of section 703(a)(2), see ALFRED W.
BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 102–07 (1993). For an argument that Congress did not
intend section 703(a)(2) to outlaw disparate impact, see Gold, supra note 22, at 567–
78.
30
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26.
28
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Id. at 425.
Id. at 427.
33
Id.
34
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1970), rev’d, 401
U.S. 424.
35
Id.; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427.
36
Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1239.
37
Id. at 1229. “The company claims that this policy was instituted because it
realized that its business was becoming more complex and that there were some
employees who were unable to adjust to the increasingly more complicated work
requirements and thus unable to advance through the company’s lines of
progression.” Id.
38
See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427–28.
32
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Prior to July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Duke Power overtly discriminated on the basis of
race in hiring and assigning employees at its Dan River Steam
Station, a power generating facility located in Draper, North
Carolina.31
That facility was divided “into five operating
departments: (1) Labor, (2) Coal Handling, (3) Operations,
(4) Maintenance, and (5) Laboratory and Test.”32 Until 1966, no
African American had been employed in any department other
than the Labor Department.33 That department provided service
to the other departments and was responsible for janitorial
services, including mixing mortar, collecting garbage, and
providing labor needed for the performance of miscellaneous
jobs.34 Labor Department employees were paid a maximum of
$1.565 per hour; that wage was less than the minimum of $1.705
per hour paid to employees in the other operating departments,
where maximum wages ranged from $3.18 per hour to $3.65 per
hour.35
In 1955, the company adopted and implemented a policy
requiring a high school education for an initial assignment to any
operating department other than Labor and for transfer from
Coal Handling to the “inside” Operations, Maintenance, or
The high school education
Laboratory Departments.36
requirement was subsequently extended to those seeking
transfers from Labor to any other department.37 On July 2, 1965,
Title VII’s effective date, an additional requirement was added
for new workers seeking placement in any department other than
the Labor Department: registering satisfactory scores on the
Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Bennett Mechanical
Comprehension Test.38 Incumbent employees who did not have a
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high school education or its equivalent could qualify for transfer
from the Labor or Coal Handling to “inside” jobs by passing the
aforementioned aptitude tests.39
African American incumbent employees filed a class action
against the company, alleging that the at-issue employment
practices violated Title VII.40 Dismissing the complaint, the
district court concluded that the “plaintiffs have failed to carry
the burden of proving that the defendant has intentionally
discriminated against them on the basis of race or color.”41 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
determined that the company’s educational and testing
requirements “did have a genuine business purpose and that the
company initiated the policy with no intention to discriminate
against Negro employees who might be hired after the adoption
of the educational requirement.”42
By a vote of eight to zero,43 the Court, in an opinion authored
by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, reversed the Fourth Circuit
and held that the challenged employment practices were
prohibited by Title VII.44 The Court determined that the
“objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from
the language of the statute.”45 The Court continued, “It was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
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39
See id. at 428 (“The requisite scores used for both initial hiring and transfer
approximated the national median for high school graduates.”).
40
Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1227–28.
41
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 251 (M.D.N.C. 1968), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 420 F.2d 1225, rev’d, 401 U.S. 424.
42
Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1232. Judge Simon Sobeloff dissented from the majority’s
opinion upholding the company’s educational and testing requirements:
The statute is unambiguous. Overt racial discrimination in hiring and
promotion is banned. So too, the statute interdicts practices that are fair in
form but discriminatory in substance. . . . The critical inquiry is business
necessity and if it cannot be shown that an employment practice which
excludes blacks stems from legitimate needs the practice must end.
Id. at 1238 (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
Moreover, Judge Sobeloff opined, “Title VII bars ‘freeze-outs’ as well as pure
discrimination, where the ‘freeze’ is achieved by requirements that are arbitrary and
have no real business justification.” Id. at 1248.
43
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. did not consider or decide the case. See
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436; see also GRAHAM, supra note 29, at 386 (“Justice
Brennan . . . recused himself from Griggs because he had once represented the Duke
Power Company . . . .”).
44
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
45
Id. at 429–30.
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group of white employees over other employees.”46 Facially
neutral and intent-neutral employment “procedures, or
tests . . . cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”47
Noting that whites registered better on the company’s
qualification requirements than did African Americans,48 the
Court opined that, because of their race, the plaintiffs “have long
received inferior education in segregated schools.”49 The Court
considered congressional intent:
Congress did not intend . . . to guarantee a job to every person
regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command
that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the
subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a
minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group,
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed.50

46

C M
Y K
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Id.
Id. at 430.
48
Id. at 430 n.6 (“In North Carolina, 1960 census statistics show that, while
34% of white males had completed high school, only 12% of Negro males had done
so.”). As for standardized tests, including the Wonderlic and Bennett tests, fiftyeight percent of whites obtained passing scores as compared to six percent of African
Americans. See id.
49
Id. at 430. The Court cited Gaston County v. United States, stating, “There,
because of the inferior education received by Negroes in North Carolina, this Court
barred the institution of a literacy test for voter registration on the ground that the
test would abridge the right to vote indirectly on account of race.” Id. (citing Gaston
Cnty. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 289 (1969)).
50
Id. at 430–31.
51
Id. at 431.
52
Id.
53
Id.
47

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 214 Side B

In a now well-known passage, the Court made clear that
“[w]hat is required by Congress is the removal of artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial
or other impermissible classification.”51 Congress has mandated
“that the posture and condition of the job-seeker be taken into
account” under a statute that “proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation.”52 The Court noted, “The touchstone
is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates
to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.”53
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. . . Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation. More than
that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden of
showing that any given requirement must have a manifest
relationship to the employment in question.60


54
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Id.
Id.
56
Id. at 431–32.
57
Id. at 432.
58
Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970),
rev’d, 401 U.S. 424) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59
Id.
60
Id.
55
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Turning to the company’s high school completion
requirement and intelligence test, the Court concluded that
neither was “shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to
successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.”54 The
company, with no preadoption or meaningful study of the
requirements’ relationship to the ability to perform jobs, relied on
its judgment that the requirements “generally would improve the
overall quality of the work force.”55 The Court found it significant
that employees who had not finished high school or performed
satisfactorily on the aptitude tests performed satisfactorily and
progressed in the departments in which they worked:56 “The
promotion record of present employees who would not be able to
meet the new criteria thus suggests the possibility that the
requirements may not be needed even for the limited purpose of
preserving the avowed policy of advancement within the
Company.”57
The Court noted the Fourth Circuit’s holding that in
adopting the high school diploma and test requirements, the
company had no “intention to discriminate against Negro
employees.”58 The absence of discriminatory intent “is suggested
by special efforts to help the undereducated employees through
Company financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition for high
school training.”59 The Court did not suggest that this nodiscriminatory-intent finding was erroneous:
[B]ut good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that
operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability.
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In the final pages of its opinion, the Court considered and
rejected the company’s contention that its intelligence tests were
permitted by section 703(h) of Title VII.61 Noting the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s Guidelines interpreting
section 703(h),62 the Court determined that the “administrative
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to
great deference” and that the EEOC’s construction, supported by
the statute and its legislative history, “affords good reason to
treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.”63
Congress has prohibited giving testing “devices and mechanisms
controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable
measure of job performance” and “has commanded . . . that any
tests used must measure the person for the job and not the
person in the abstract.”64
An act of judicial lawmaking, Griggs created a cause of
action not expressly provided by Title VII as originally enacted.65
The Court “bridge[d] the gap between the egalitarian ideals
expressed in the law books and the everyday realities of the job
market.”66 Instead of asking whether the company intentionally
discriminated against African American employees, the Court
asked whether the company’s practices constituted “artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment”67 resulting
in a disparate impact not justified by business necessity.68 To be
sure, the Court’s focus on and interpretation of section 703(a)(2),
and its references to congressional objectives and direction, gives
the impression of a Court engaged in finding and not making

C M
Y K
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61
Id. at 433–36 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h) (West 2014) (“[N]or shall it be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results
of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”)).
62
See id. at 433 & n.9 (quoting EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing
Procedures (Aug 24, 1966); Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 35 Fed.
Reg. 12,333 (Aug. 1, 1970) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1607 (1978))).
63
Id. at 433–34.
64
Id. at 436.
65
See Lewis v. City of Chi., 560 U.S. 205, 211 (2010) (“As originally enacted,
Title VII did not expressly prohibit employment practices that cause a disparate
impact.”).
66
3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 185–86
(2014).
67
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
68
See JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
112 (2014).
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law. That impression is illusory, however, as the Court’s
employee-protective opinion and analysis gave primacy of place
to addressing the consequences of employment actions and is the
judicial work product of a Court unwilling to turn a blind eye to
the freezing and lock-in effects of prior discriminatory
employment practices. The Griggs Court went where the 1964
Congress did not go; the Court made law.69
B.

Post-Griggs Rulings

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

69
For the argument that Griggs’ interpretation of Title VII is not legitimate and
disparate-impact liability is “a rule without reason,” see Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2526, 2531 (2015) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
70
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
71
Id. at 431, 435–36.
72
Id. at 425.
73
Id.
74
See id. at 431–36.
75
Id. at 436.
76
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
77
See id. at 323–24, 324 n.2. The minimum weight requirement was 120
pounds, and the minimum height requirement was five feet two inches.
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Court decisions issued in the years following Griggs gave
further shape and content to disparate-impact law and doctrine.
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,70 the Court held that an
employer’s validation study assessing the job relatedness of
employment tests was materially defective.71 The Court noted
that once a plaintiff or class makes out a prima facie case of
discrimination, the employer bears the “burden of proving that
its tests are ‘job related.’ ”72 If the employer meets that burden,
the plaintiff could still “show that other tests or selection devices,
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy
workmanship.’ ”73 Finding several flaws in the employer’s test
validation efforts,74 the Court remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings.75
Dothard v. Rawlinson76 addressed a plaintiff’s disparateimpact action challenging facially neutral minimum weight and
height requirements for all law enforcement officers established
by an Alabama statute.77 The plaintiff, who sought employment
as a correctional counselor with the Alabama Board of
Corrections, convinced a three-judge district court that the
weight and height requirements constituted arbitrary barriers to
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employment opportunities that Title VII prohibited.78 Guided by
Griggs and Albemarle Paper, the Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice Potter Stewart, concluded that the plaintiffs
established a prima facie case as evidenced by the percentages of
women excluded from work opportunities due to the weight and
height requirements, considered separately and jointly.79
Finding that the standards had a discriminatory impact on
female applicants, the Court turned to the employer’s argument
that the requirements were job related.80 The employer had the
burden of showing that the requirements had “a manifest
relationship to the employment in question.”81 According to the
employer, the requirements had a relationship to strength
essential to effective performance of the job of correctional
counselor.82 But the employer produced no evidence correlating
the requirements with a requisite amount of job-related
strength.83 Additionally, the Court opined, if strength was a bona
fide job-related quality, the employer could have adopted and
validated a test directly measuring the strength of applicants.84
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,85 the question
before the Court was whether a transit authority’s regulation
prohibiting the employment of users of narcotics, including
former heroin addicts receiving methadone treatment, violated
Title VII. The Court, per Justice John Paul Stevens, determined
that the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence did not establish a prima
facie violation of Title VII.86 Assuming that a prima facie case

78
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Id. at 323, 328.
See id. at 329–30. The Court noted the district court’s determination that the
minimum height requirement would exclude 33.29% of women in the United States
between the ages of eighteen and seventy-nine and only 1.28% of men in that age
range. The weight requirement would exclude 22.29% of women and 2.35% of men in
that age group, and the height and weight requirements combined would exclude
41.13% of women and less than 1% of men. See id.
80
Id. at 331.
81
Id. at 329 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1974))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
82
Id. at 331.
83
Id.
84
See id. at 332.
85
440 U.S. 568, 570–71 (1979).
86
See id. at 583–84. The Court concluded that a statistic regarding the number
of employees referred to the employer’s medical director for suspected violations of
the narcotics rule “tells us nothing about the racial composition of the employees
suspected of using methadone,” and noted that the record did not contain
information about the number of African American, Latino, or white employees
79
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dismissed for using methadone. See id. at 584–85. While the district court noted that
approximately sixty-three percent of persons receiving methadone maintenance in
New York City public programs were African Americans or Latinos, it was not
known “how many of these persons ever worked or sought to work for” the employer.
Id. at 585–86 (discussing other problems with the statistical evidence).
87
Id. at 587.
88
Id. at 587 n.31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
457 U.S. 440 (1982).
91
Id. at 442–43 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92
See id. at 446–47.
93
Id. at 443.
94
Id. at 443 n.4 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1981)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The eighty percent rule provides that a selection rate that “is less
than [eighty percent] . . . of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded . . . as evidence of adverse impact.” 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
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had been established, the Court concluded that it was rebutted
by the employer’s demonstration that the narcotics rule was job
related.87 The employer’s “legitimate employment goals of safety
and efficiency require the exclusion of all users of illegal
narcotics, barbiturates, and amphetamines, and of a majority of
all methadone users,” as well as the exclusion of all methadone
Accordingly, the
users from “safety sensitive” positions.88
challenged rule bore a “manifest relationship to the employment
in question.”89
Consider Connecticut v. Teal,90 wherein the Court, by a fiveto-four vote, held that an employer’s “bottom line” result in a
promotion process did not preclude lawsuits alleging racial
discrimination effected by an examination that had a disparate
impact on African-American employees.91 Writing for the Court,
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. noted that Griggs and its progeny
established a three-part analysis of disparate-impact claims:
(1) the plaintiff’s prima facie case, (2) the employer’s
demonstration that the requirement has a manifest relationship
to the employment in question, and (3) the plaintiff’s showing
that the employer’s use of the practice was a pretext for
discrimination.92
The results of the at-issue examination revealed that 54.2%
of
African-American
candidates,
but
not
the
four
African-American plaintiffs, passed the exam.93 As that number
was approximately sixty-eight percent of the pass rate for white
candidates, the exam resulted in disparate impact under the
EEOC’s “eighty percent rule.”94
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Id. at 452–53.
Id. at 453.
97
Id. at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 455.
100
Id. at 453–54. A dissenting Justice Lewis F. Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger and Justices William H. Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor,
argued that there cannot be a disparate-impact violation absent evidence of
disparate impact on a group. See id. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
also expressed his discontent and predicted that the “practical effect of today’s
decision may well be the adoption of simple quota hiring.” Id. at 463.
96
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The employer asked the Court to recognize an exception for
cases in which an employer hires or promotes a sufficient number
of African-American employees in response to and as
compensation for a discriminatory test.95 The Court answered in
the negative.96 The suggestion of a “bottom line” defense to a
discrimination claim brought by an individual employee
“confuse[s] unlawful discrimination with discriminatory intent.”97
While an employer’s good-faith effort to achieve a
nondiscriminatory work force can in some instances rebut an
inference of intentional discrimination, “resolution of the factual
question of intent is not what is at issue in this case.”98 “It is
clear that Congress never intended to give an employer license to
discriminate against some employees on the basis of race or sex
merely because he favorably treats other members of the
employees’ group.”99 Title VII protects individual employees from
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination; “[t]he
principal focus of the statute is the protection of the individual
employee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a
whole.”100
From the foregoing discussion, one can glean the elements of
a disparate-impact methodology in which plaintiffs’ and
employers’ required showings were clearly defined. With regard
to the employer’s burden, the Court’s jurisprudence made clear
that the employer had to prove that a challenged employment
practice was job related and had a manifest relationship to the
employment in question. Failure to satisfy that burden was fatal
to the employer’s defense.
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II. FROM WARDS COVE TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
The Griggs disparate-impact theory was and remains
controversial. Under that theory, an employer can violate Title
VII even in the absence of evidence that the employer
intentionally discriminated on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. The analysis “requires employers to
reconsider policies adopted for legitimate reasons, but with little
thought to their effect on workforce diversity.”101
This
requirement has been criticized:
Conservatives object that this unduly burdens innocent
employers. It involves the courts and regulatory agencies in the
intricacies of businesses and enterprises with which they have
little familiarity. The employer is best suited to determine
whether or not a test or selection practice is job related, they
complain—not judges or government bureaucrats. Free-market
incentives amply punish employers who select employees
irrationally.
Judicial intermeddling and bureaucratic
micromanaging waste the resources of employers, who must
navigate a maze of regulations to defend innocent selection
practices. Worst of all, the harried employer, faced with the
threat of liability, may insulate itself by adopting quota hiring
so as to avoid disparate impact altogether, rather than face the
costly and daunting task of defending its practices.102
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101
RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 117 (2011).
102
Id.
103
ROBERT BELTON, THE CRUSADE FOR EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE: THE
GRIGGS V. DUKE POWER STORY 278 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 2014). The late Professor
Belton was one of the legal strategists in the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund’s civil rights litigation campaign for workplace justice, out of which Griggs
arose.
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Resistance to Griggs became official government policy with
the 1981 election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency. “A major
objective of the Reagan administration’s civil rights agenda was
getting rid of the Griggs disparate impact theory and enshrining
forever in our civil rights laws and jurisprudence the proposition
that our commitment to equality prohibits only disparate
treatment or intentional discrimination.”103
The administration’s Solicitor General, Charles Fried,
believed that Griggs “had greatly expanded the exposure of
employers to Title VII lawsuits by minority workers” and
subjected “to ruinous liability” employers who could not explain
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“to a court’s or bureaucrat’s satisfaction” how a challenged
practice was justified by business necessity.104
“[M]any
employers, federal enforcement officials, and lower courts
understood Griggs as a mandate for quota hiring.”105 Fried
“concentrated on . . . taming Griggs, with its pressure toward
quotas,”106 and saw the opportunity to do just that in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio.107
A.

The Wards Cove Decision

In Wards Cove, the Court considered a disparate impact
action brought by a class of nonwhite salmon cannery workers
against two employers operating salmon canneries in Alaska.108
Unskilled “cannery jobs” on the cannery line were filled
predominantly by Filipinos and Alaska Natives, and skilled
“noncannery jobs” were filled with predominantly white
employees hired from the employers’ offices in Washington and
Oregon.109 The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the
employers’ hiring and promotion practices “were responsible for
the racial stratification of the work force and had denied them
and other nonwhites employment as noncannery workers on the
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104
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 93, 94 (1991); see also Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 694 (2011) (“Disparate impact lawsuits also carry too
great a risk of unjustified liability. . . . Given the legal uncertainties and practical
difficulties . . . , employers run a significant risk of being found liable regardless of
whether their methods [were] valid . . . .”).
105
FRIED, supra note 106, at 95.
106
Id. at 119. Note that Title VII section 703(j) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter . . . require[s] any employer . . . to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of
the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group
on account of an imbalance . . . in comparison with the total number or
percentage of [such] persons . . . in any community, State, section, or other
area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or
other area . . . .
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(j) (West 2014). One commentator has argued that section
703(j) “should have killed adverse impact aborning.” Gold, supra note 22, at 510.
107
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
108
See id. at 646–47.
109
See id. at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted). Cannery workers and
noncannery employees lived in separate dormitories and ate in separate mess halls.
See id.
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[The Ninth Circuit’s] theory . . . would mean that any employer
who had a segment of his work force that was—for some
reason—racially imbalanced, could be haled into court and
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110
Id. at 647–48. The employment practices challenged by the plaintiffs
included “nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, separate
hiring channels, [and] a practice of not promoting from within.” Id. at 647.
111
Id. at 648.
112
See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439, 444–45, 450 (9th Cir.
1987), rev’d, 490 U.S. 642.
113
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 644, 650.
114
Id. at 644–45, 649–50.
115
Id. at 650.
116
Id. at 651.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 652.
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basis of race.”110 The district court rejected the plaintiffs’
claims.111 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had made out
a prima facie case of disparate impact in hiring and that the
employers bore the burden of proving that any disparate impact
caused by their hiring practices was justified by business
necessity.112
The Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, reversed the
Ninth Circuit.113
Writing for the majority, Justice Byron
Raymond White, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony
M. Kennedy, reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the
plaintiffs’ prima facie case was established by a comparison of
the percentage of nonwhite cannery workers and the percentage
of nonwhite noncannery workers.114 Noting that the proper
comparison in a disparate-impact case is “between the racial
composition of the qualified persons in the labor market and the
persons holding at-issue jobs,”115 Justice White determined that
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was flawed. “[W]ith respect to the
skilled noncannery jobs at issue here, the cannery work force in
no way reflected ‘the pool of qualified job applicants’ or the
‘qualified population in the labor force.’ ”116 He thus concluded
that
“comparing
the
number
of
nonwhites
occupying . . . [noncannery] jobs to the number of nonwhites
filling cannery worker positions is nonsensical.”117
Additionally, Justice White opined that the Ninth Circuit’s
approach could not be squared with the Court’s precedents or the
goals of Title VII118:
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forced to engage in the expensive and time-consuming task of
defending the “business necessity” of the methods used to select
the other members of his work force. The only practicable
option for many employers would be to adopt racial quotas,
insuring that no portion of their work forces deviated in racial
composition from the other portions thereof; this is a result that
Congress expressly rejected in drafting Title VII.119

Furthermore, Justice White continued, “Racial imbalance in
one segment of an employer’s work force does not, without more,
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with respect to
the selection of workers for the employer’s other positions.”120
Absent barriers or practices deterring qualified nonwhite
workers from applying for noncannery jobs, “if the percentage of
selected applicants who are nonwhite is not significantly less
than the percentage of qualified applicants who are nonwhite,
the employer’s selection mechanism probably does not operate
with a disparate impact on minorities.”121
Having reversed the Ninth Circuit, the Court remanded the
case for further proceedings on the question of whether the
plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact.122 Justice White addressed the issue of disparate-impact
causation, relying on and quoting Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust:


119
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Id. (citing Title VII § 703(j), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(j) (West 2014)).
Id. at 653.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 649.
123
Id. at 656 (alterations in original) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Justice Kennedy, who did not participate in Watson, provided the fifth and
majority-creating vote in Wards Cove.
120
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[W]e note that the plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima
facie case goes beyond the need to show that there are
statistical disparities in the employer’s work force. The plaintiff
must begin by identifying the specific employment practice that
is challenged . . . . Especially in cases where an employer
combines subjective criteria with the use of more rigid
standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in our view
responsible for isolating and identifying the specific
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any
observed statistical disparities.123
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On remand, the plaintiffs would have to specifically show “that
each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on
employment opportunities for whites and nonwhites” and “to
hold otherwise would result in employers being potentially liable
for ‘the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical
imbalances in the composition of their work forces.’ ”124
The showing of a prima facie case would shift the focus of the
case to “any business justification” an employer offers for using
the challenged practice.125 “The touchstone of this inquiry is a
reasoned review of the employer’s justification for his use of the
challenged practice.”126 The employer “carries the burden of
producing evidence of a business justification for his employment
practice” and that practice need not be “essential” or
“indispensable” to the business.127 Justice White made clear that
this approach conformed to the rule governing disparatetreatment cases in which “the plaintiff bears the burden of
disproving an employer’s assertion that the adverse employment
action or practice was based solely on a legitimate neutral
This importation of disparate-treatment
consideration.”128
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124
Id. at 657 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 992). A dissenting Justice Stevens
argued that “[t]his additional proof requirement is unwarranted.” Id. at 672
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]n a disparate-impact case, proof of numerous
questionable employment practices ought to fortify an employee’s assertion that the
practices caused racial disparities. Ordinary principles of fairness require that Title
VII actions be tried like ‘any lawsuit.’ The changes the majority makes today,
tipping the scales in favor of employers, are not faithful to those principles.”). Id. at
673 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (citing U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983)).
125
See id. at 658 (majority opinion).
126
Id. at 659.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 660. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the
Court took up the issue of the order and allocation of proof in a Title VII intentional
discrimination case. The Court stated that the plaintiff “must carry the initial
burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.”
411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff makes that showing, the “burden then must shift to
the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee’s rejection.” Id. If the employer’s articulated reason meets the plaintiff’s
prima facie case, the plaintiff must “be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the
employer’s] stated reason . . . was in fact pretext.” Id. at 804. In a subsequent case,
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Court
addressed again the evidentiary burdens placed on employers defending Title VII
disparate-treatment actions. The Court noted that the ultimate burden of
persuading the factfinder that the employer discriminated remains with the plaintiff
throughout the litigation. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. The plaintiff’s establishment of
a prima facie case creates a presumption that the employer has engaged in unlawful
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methodology into disparate-impact analysis relieved the
employer of its Griggs-mandated burden of proving the job
relatedness and business necessity of its challenged practices. In
an incredible passage, Justice White stated:
We acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can be read
as suggesting otherwise. But to the extent that those cases
speak of an employers’ “burden of proof” with respect to a
legitimate business justification defense, they should have been
understood to mean an employer’s production—but not
persuasion—burden.129

The Court thus made a huge change in disparate-impact doctrine
while denying that it was doing any such thing.
Finally, Justice White instructed, plaintiffs unable to carry
their burden of persuasion on the question of the employer’s
business justification could still prevail by persuading the
factfinder that other tests or selection devices would serve the
employer’s legitimate interests without the undesirable racial
effect.130 The alternative practice “must be equally effective as
[the employer’s] chosen hiring procedures in achieving [the
Meeting that
employer’s] legitimate employment goals.”131
burden would establish that the employer’s use of the challenged
practice was a pretext for discrimination.132
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conduct. Id. at 254. The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut that
presumption by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. Id. The employer “need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated
by the proffered reasons.” Id. Where that burden of production is met, the plaintiff’s
prima facie case is rebutted and the plaintiff must then prove pretext, that is, prove
that “the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This
burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has
been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 256. For more recent Court
decisions addressing the shifting burdens of proof in disparate-treatment cases, see
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
129
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660 (citations omitted) (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at
1006–08 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Transp. Mgmt.
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404 n.7 (1983)).
130
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660.
131
Id. at 661. “Factors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative
selection devices are relevant in determining whether they would be equally as
effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer’s legitimate business
goals.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (plurality opinion))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
132
Id. at 660.
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Id. at 661 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 662.
135
Id. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136
Id. at 665–66 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32
(1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137
Id. at 668.
138
Id. at 660 (majority opinion).
139
Id. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation mark omitted).
140
Id. (alterations in original).
141
Id. at 671–72.
142
Id. at 672.
143
Id.
134
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Four Justices dissented. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, joined
by Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, argued that the
majority had “upset[] the longstanding distribution of burdens of
proof in Title VII disparate-impact cases.”133 “One wonders
whether the majority still believes that race discrimination—or,
more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites—is a
problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was.”134
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, stated, “I cannot join this latest sojourn into judicial
activism.”135 Griggs made clear that in disparate-impact cases
“[t]he touchstone is business necessity” and that “Congress has
placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question.”136 The employer’s disparate-impact
burden “is proof of an affirmative defense of business necessity”
and not “simply one of coming forward with evidence of
legitimate business purpose.”137 Responding to Justice White’s
declaration that precedent “should have been understood to mean
an employer’s . . . burden,”138 Justice Stevens opined that he was
“astonished to read that the touchstone of this inquiry is a
reasoned review of the employer’s justification for his use of the
challenged practice.”139 He also noted, “[T]here is no requirement
that the . . . practice be . . . ‘essential.’ ”140 “This casual—almost
summary—rejection of the statutory construction that developed
in the wake of Griggs is most disturbing.”141 In his view, Griggs
“correctly reflected the intent of the Congress that enacted Title
VII” and, even if it did not, he “could not join a rejection of a
consistent interpretation of a federal statute”142 Justice Stevens
also noted, “Congress frequently revisits this statutory scheme
and can readily correct [the Court’s] mistakes if [the Court]
misread[s] [Congress’s] meaning.”143
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That Wards Cove is an exemplar of judicial lawmaking
cannot be denied. Eighteen years of Griggs’ Court-created
regulatory regime did not stop the employer-protective Wards
Cove Court from changing settled law. At the prima facie case
stage of disparate-impact litigation, the Court introduced a
“ ‘cumulation’ principle”144 and announced that plaintiffs would
henceforth have to specifically identify and isolate the particular
employment practice that caused the disparate impact. “This
ruling posed a substantial proof problem for the plaintiffs in
cases in which employers rely upon a group of interrelated
practices in making employment decisions.”145 Moreover, and
significantly, the Court jettisoned the employer’s burden of
proving that a challenged practice was job related and essential,
replacing it with a business justification standard subject to a
lesser burden-of-production requirement. While the structure of
Griggs was left standing, the foundations of the Court’s 1971
decision had been weakened.
B.

The Civil Rights Act of 1991

An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established . . . [when] a complaining party demonstrates that a
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a


144

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

See BELTON, supra note 105, at 311.
Id. at 310.
146
See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections
of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). This legislation responded to the Court’s decisions in Wards
Cove, 490 U.S. 642, Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S.
754 (1989), Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), Lorance v. AT&T Technologies., Inc., 490 U.S. 900
(1989), and Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). For a discussion of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act and its impact on employment discrimination litigation, see Michael
Selmi, The Supreme Court’s Surprising and Strategic Response to the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 281 (2011).
147
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071.
148
Id.
145
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Congress responded to Wards Cove in the Civil Rights Act of
1991.146 One of the stated purposes of the act was “to codify the
concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ enunciated by the
Supreme Court” in Griggs “and in the other Supreme Court
decisions prior to” Wards Cove.147 The act amended Title VII
section 703 by adding subsection (k).148
As amended, Title VII provides the framework for
establishing the occurrence of an unlawful employment practice:
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disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity . . . .149
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149
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West 2014). “The term ‘demonstrates’
means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.” § 2000e(m).
150
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
151
Id.
152
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
153
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(C).
154
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
155
Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 213 (2010).
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To demonstrate that a particular practice causes a disparate
impact, “the complaining party shall demonstrate that each
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate
This demonstration is not required where the
impact.”150
“complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the
elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking [sic] process are not
capable of separation for analysis”; where that showing is made,
“the decisionmaking [sic] process may be analyzed as one
employment practice.”151
Section 703(k) provides, further, that a complaining party
can establish disparate impact through “an alternative
employment practice” which the employer refuses to adopt.152
That demonstration “shall be in accordance with the law as it
existed on June 4, 1989, [the day before the decision in Wards
Cove,] with respect to the concept of ‘alternative employment
practice.’ ”153
In codifying the disparate-impact cause of action, Congress
left in place the Wards Cove cumulation principle while providing
a complaining party with the opportunity of showing that an
employer’s decision-making process should be analyzed as one
employment practice.
Congress rejected and legislatively
overruled Wards Cove’s business justification standard and
reinstated the Griggs burden-of-persuasion rule governing an
employer’s job-relatedness and business necessity defense.154 As
the Court recently noted, “Unless and until the defendant pleads
and proves a business-necessity defense, the plaintiff wins simply
by showing” the “essential ingredients of a disparate-impact
claim.”155
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III. RICCI V. DESTEFANO
In Ricci v. DeStefano,156 New Haven, Connecticut firefighters
seeking to qualify for promotion to the rank of lieutenant or
captain took examinations given by the city.157 The results of the
examinations revealed that white candidates received higher
scores than minority candidates.158 The city, “faced with a prima
facie case of disparate-impact liability,”159 threw out the test and
made no promotions.160 White firefighters and one Latino
firefighter,161 alleging that they likely would have been promoted
under the discarded test,162 sued the city and claimed that they
had been subjected to intentional disparate-treatment
discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII.163

156

557 U.S. 557 (2009).
Id. at 564. The city’s contract with the New Haven firefighters’ union
required applicants for lieutenant and captain positions to take written and oral
examinations. See id. The written exam accounted for sixty percent of the applicant’s
total score, with the oral exam accounting for forty percent of that score. See id.
158
Id. at 562.
159
Id. at 586. The Court’s prima facie case determination was based on the
following:
The racial impact here was significant . . . . On the captain exam, the pass
rate for white candidates was 64 percent but was 37.5 percent for both
black and Hispanic candidates. On the lieutenant exam, the pass rate for
white candidates was 58.1 percent; for black candidates, 31.6 percent; and
for Hispanic candidates, 20 percent.
Id. The minority pass rates “fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the
EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.” Id.
160
See id. at 574. Voting on a motion to certify the examination results, the
city’s civil service board, with one member recused, deadlocked two-to-two, resulting
in a decision not to certify the results. See id.
161
Richard Primus notes that published reports referred to the Ricci plaintiffs
as a group of nineteen white firefighters and one Latino firefighter. “That said,
‘Latino’ and ‘white’ are not mutually exclusive categories, and according to published
reports [Lieutenant Benjamin] Vargas [fell] into both categories.” Richard Primus,
The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1342 n.4 (2010).
162
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562–63.
163
The plaintiffs also alleged that the city violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”). The Court did not decide the equal protection
question. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563. A concurring Justice Scalia stated that the
Court’s resolution of the case on statutory grounds “merely postpones the evil day on
which the Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are
the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII . . . consistent with the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection.” Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring). He argued, “Title
VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring
employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions
based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking [sic]
157
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The city argued that discarding the test results was necessary to
avoid exposure to liability in any disparate-impact suit brought
by the minority firefighters.164
By a five-to-four vote, the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, concluded that “race-based action like the City’s in this
case is impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can
demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the
action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact
statute.”165 Finding no genuine dispute that the city did not have
the requisite strong basis in evidence, Justice Kennedy
determined that the plaintiffs’ Title VII rights had been
violated.166
Justice Kennedy’s analysis rested on a questionable and
contestable premise: “The City’s actions would violate the
disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid
defense. All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to
certify the examination results because of the statistical
disparity based on race—i.e., how minority candidates had
performed when compared to white candidates.”167 Having
characterized the city’s actions as race-based,168 he concluded,
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is . . . discriminatory.” Id. For more on this issue, see Richard A. Primus, Equal
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003).
164
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 579.
168
Interestingly, and as noted by Justin Driver, Justice Kennedy’s concern
about the city’s race-conscious conduct is set forth in an opinion in which the Justice
himself considers race. See Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
404, 407 (2012). Justice Kennedy recounted the testimony of three witnesses who
spoke to the city’s civil service board about their views on testing and New Haven’s
promotion examinations. Justice Kennedy wrote that Vincent Lewis, a witness who
looked at the exam and concluded that candidates should know the tested material,
“is black”; he did not identify the race of the other two witnesses. Ricci, 557 U.S. at
570–71. Driver observes comments on this omission:
This identification is striking because, in a decision that cautions against
the dangers of racially disparate treatment, it treats Lewis disparately by
race. Ricci’s disclosure that Lewis is black suggests that his race carries
unusual significance, and that it is germane to the case in a way that the
other two witnesses’ racial identities are not.
Driver, supra note 169. For Driver, the “most compelling interpretation” of the
communication of Lewis’s race “understands Lewis’s blackness to support the notion
that New Haven’s exam was nondiscriminatory.” Id. Driver notes that another
witness who distrusted the exam identified herself as black but was not so identified
by Justice Kennedy; thus, “Justice Kennedy’s opinion—perhaps unwittingly—
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Had the Court mechanically applied Title VII’s burdens of proof,
it would have been forced to conclude that the potential
disparate impact claim against the city would have succeeded:
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highlighted an expert’s blackness who supported the examination, but rendered
raceless a black expert who cast doubt on it.” Id. at 408.
169
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580, 584.
170
Id. at 579–80.
171
Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening
Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 82 (2010) (internal
quotation mark omitted) Ricci imposes “on employers a standard imported” from
equal protection review “to constrain employers from taking ‘race-based action’ to
avoid disparate impact liability.” Id.
172
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 582 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 500 (1989)).
173
Id. at 583.
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“The City rejected the test results solely because the higher
scoring candidates were white” and invalidated the firefighters’
efforts “in sole reliance upon race-based statistics.”169 On that
view, the case before the Court did not involve an employer’s
“well intentioned or benevolent” efforts to comply with Title VII’s
disparate-impact provision, but rather involved the action of an
employer who “made its employment decision because of race.”170
Dividing Title VII into separate and, in his view, conflicting
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact prohibitions, Justice
Kennedy embarked on a search for a standard which would give
effect to Title VII’s prohibition of both intentional and
unintentional discrimination. He found that standard—the
“strong basis in evidence” standard—in race-conscious
affirmative action cases interpreting and applying the Equal
Protection Clause.171 As Justice Kennedy noted, those cases held
that certain race-conscious government actions remedying past
racial discrimination “are constitutional only where there is a
‘strong basis in evidence’ that the remedial actions were
necessary.”172 “Applying the strong-basis-in-evidence standard to
Title VII gives effect to both the disparate-treatment and
disparate-impact provisions, allowing violations of one in the
name of compliance with the other only in certain, narrow
circumstances. . . . And the standard appropriately constrains
employers’ discretion in making race-based decisions . . . .”173
Justice Kennedy’s importation of equal protection analysis
into Title VII effectively substituted the strong-basis-in-evidence
standard for the business-necessity defense mandated by the
statute. Explaining the reason for this move, he stated:
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there was a statistically disparate impact, and the city would
clearly not satisfy its burden to show business necessity if its
position was that the tests were not necessary. . . . The
language of Title VII makes business necessity an affirmative
defense, so the Court’s analysis required some unacknowledged
surgery on the United States Code.174

Empathy and sympathy for the Ricci plaintiffs were also on
display in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.175 He noted statements
from Frank Ricci, one of the plaintiff-firefighters.
Ricci stated that he had “several learning disabilities,”
including dyslexia; that he had spent more than $1,000 to
purchase the materials and pay his neighbor to read them on
tape so he could “give it [his] best shot”; and that he had studied
“8 to 13 hours a day to prepare” for the test.176

Examinations like those given by the city “create legitimate
expectations on the part of those who took the tests” and “some of
the firefighters here invested substantial time, money, and
personal commitment in preparing for the tests,”177 making the
city’s “reliance on raw racial statistics at the end of the

174

Primus, supra note 162, at 1368 (footnote omitted).
Interestingly, President Barack Obama, speaking after Justice David H.
Souter announced his retirement from the Court and prior to his nomination of
Sonia Sotomayor as Souter’s replacement, declared that the “quality of empathy, of
understanding and identifying with people’s hopes and struggles” was “an essential
ingredient” for Souter’s replacement. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Say It With Feeling?
Not This Time Around, N.Y TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A15 (internal quotation mark
omitted). For Senator Orrin Hatch, a Republican from Utah, empathy was “a code
word for an activist judge.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). During the
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on her nomination to the Court, Sotomayor
repudiated the notion of empathy-based judging. See Peter Baker & Charlie Savage,
Groundwork for Next Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at A1. The Ricci case was
mentioned during Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings. Then-Judge Sotomayor was a
member of the Second Circuit panel affirming the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for New Haven. In a per curiam opinion the court stated:
We are not unsympathetic to the plaintiffs’ expression of frustration. Mr.
Ricci, for example, who is dyslexic, made intensive efforts that appear to
have resulted in his scoring highly on one of the exams, only to have it
invalidated. But it simply does not follow that he has a viable Title VII
claim.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev’d, 557 U.S. 557
(2009). Frank Ricci appeared before the Judiciary Committee and expressed his view
that Judge Sotomayor had discriminated and ruled against him because he is white.
See Robin Abcarian et al., Conservatives Say It’s Their Turn for Empowerment, L.A.
TIMES, Sep. 17, 2009, at A1.
176
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 567–68 (alteration in original).
177
Id. at 583–84.
175
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Id. at 593.
“The legitimacy of an employee’s expectation depends on the legitimacy of
the selection method.” Id. at 630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
180
Id. at 609; see also Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 172, at 88–91
(examining the facts of Ricci against the historical and contemporary patterns of
exclusion and discrimination against minority firefighters).
181
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 609.
182
Id. at 610.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 610–11.
185
Id. at 611.
186
Id. at 624.
187
Id. at 627 (citing Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).
179
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process . . . all the more severe.”178 Of course, employees also
have a legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of a
flawed test.179
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by Justices
John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer,
found problematic several aspects of Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion, an opinion that did not include “important parts of the
story.”180 “Firefighting is a profession in which the legacy of
racial discrimination casts an especially long shadow.”181 In the
early 1970s, African Americans and Latinos made up 30% of New
Haven’s population but only 3.6% of the city’s 502 firefighters.182
A lawsuit filed against and a settlement agreement entered into
by the city “produced some positive change”: In 2003, thirty
percent of the city’s firefighters were African American and
sixteen percent were Latino.183 The fire department’s senior
officer ranks were nine percent African American and nine
percent Latino, and one of the department’s twenty-one captains
“It is against this backdrop of
was African American.184
entrenched inequality that the promotion process at issue in this
litigation should be assessed.”185
Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg saw not “even a
hint of ‘conflict’ between an employer’s obligations under [Title
VII’s] disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions,”186
viewing those provisions as complementary. She also questioned
the Court’s turn to constitutional law for an evidentiary
standard, noting that the Court has held that the Equal
Protection Clause “prohibits only intentional discrimination; it
Justice
does not have a disparate-impact component.”187
Ginsburg argued, further, that employers who reject selection
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[T]he conservative majority of the Court invalidated an
employer’s voluntary efforts to remedy the adverse impact of
several promotion tests it had administered. . . . [T]he Court
deemed the tests valid even though the tests had not been
subject to any legal scrutiny and despite strong arguments that
the tests could not be validated under existing law.194
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192

Id. at 625.
Id. at 625–26.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 632–33.
Id. at 634–35.
Id. at 638.
Selmi, supra note 147, at 298 (footnote omitted).
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criteria “due to reasonable doubts about their reliability can
hardly be held to have engaged in discrimination ‘because of’
race,” and that an employer’s “reasonable endeavor to comply
with the law and to ensure that qualified candidates of all races
have a fair opportunity to compete is simply not what Congress
meant to interdict.”188 Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg would have
held, “[A]n employer who jettisons a selection device when its
disproportionate racial impact becomes apparent does not violate
Title VII’s disparate-treatment bar automatically or at all,
subject to this key condition: The employer must have good
cause to believe the device would not withstand examination for
business necessity.”189
In Justice Ginsburg’s view, “New Haven had ample cause to
believe its selection process was flawed and not justified by
business necessity,” for no one disputed the existence of a prima
facie case of disparate impact.190 She also questioned the nature
of the city’s promotions examination and the heavy reliance on
written tests.191 “[M]ost municipal employers do not evaluate
their fire-officer candidates as New Haven does,” and testimony
before the city’s civil service board indicated that alternative
methods were more reliable and less discriminatory.192 “[T]he
City had good cause to fear disparate-impact liability” and there
was “no tenable explanation why the evidence of the tests’
multiple deficiencies does not create at least a triable issue under
a strong-basis-in-evidence standard.”193
As one scholar has aptly noted, the Ricci Court “revert[ed] to
its Wards Cove days”:
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Making law again, the Ricci Court, as had the Wards Cove Court,
imported an intentional discrimination and disparate-treatment
analysis into disparate-impact litigation.
In so doing, Ricci adopted and implemented an
employee-protective—more precisely, a nonminority-employeeprotective—approach to Title VII.
This approach was so
protective that, having announced a new strong-basis-in-evidence
standard, the Court did not remand the case for the lower court’s
The Court
consideration and application of the rule.195
determined that “there is no evidence—let alone the required
strong basis in evidence—that the tests were flawed because they
were not job related or because other, equally valid and less
discriminatory tests were available to the City.”196 Accordingly,
summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs on their
disparate-treatment claims.197
However, the Court did not stop there:
If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a
disparate-impact suit, then in light of our holding today it
should be clear that the City would avoid disparate-impact
liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not
certified the results, it would have been subject to
disparate-treatment liability.198


195
196
197
198
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201

04/08/2016 13:04:55

199

See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 631.
Id. at 592 (majority opinion).
Id. at 593.
Id.
See Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 201 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 203, 209.
Id. at 206.
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In a post-Ricci lawsuit, an African-American firefighter sued
New Haven, alleging that the city’s promotion examination
violated Title VII’s disparate-impact provision.199 Vacating the
district court’s dismissal of the action, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the action was not
barred.200 In the Second Circuit’s view, the Court’s sentence
stating that the city would avoid disparate-impact liability was
dicta and “d[id] not present a holding but rather a conclusion—an
apparent logical truth—derived from the holding” in Ricci.201
Thus, and as a consequence of the Court’s lawmaking activities,
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New Haven has to “suffer the whipsaw effect” of defending in a
disparate-impact suit, the very same test which the city has duly
certified pursuant to an order of the Court.202
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s disparate-impact jurisprudence is a
prominent example of judicial lawmaking at its best or worst,
depending on one’s perspectives and views. The Court initially
created the disparate-impact cause of action in Griggs and has
repeatedly formulated and implemented legislative-like
evidentiary rules and schemes governing the litigation and
adjudication of such claims. Congressional entry into the field
with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, responding to Wards Cove,
codified the disparate-impact cause of action and expressly set
out the elements of a plaintiff’s claim, the employer’s defense
thereto, and the parties’ respective burdens of proof. But this
legislative act did not deter or prevent the Court from making
law yet again when, in Ricci, a bare majority created and applied
a new and extrastatutory rule and held that an employer violated
Title VII by discarding what the employer believed to be a
disparate-impact-causing examination. Evidently, the Court has
not hesitated to make Title VII disparate-impact law and policy.
Whether and how it will continue to do so in the future warrants
ongoing scrutiny.
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